By Bernard Williams
What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its moral risks--and its attainable rewards? How does it fluctuate from technology? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses those questions and provides a remarkable imaginative and prescient of philosophy as essentially various from technology in its goals and strategies although there's nonetheless in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written together with his designated mixture of rigor, mind's eye, intensity, and humanism, the e-book amply demonstrates why Williams was once one of many maximum philosophers of the 20th century.
Spanning his occupation from his first book to 1 of his final lectures, the book's formerly unpublished or uncollected essays deal with metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, in addition to the scope and boundaries of philosophy itself. The essays are unified via Williams's consistent drawback that philosophy hold touch with the human difficulties that animate it within the first position. because the book's editor, A. W. Moore, writes in his creation, the identify essay is "a type of manifesto for Williams's belief of his personal life's work." it's the place he so much without delay asks "what philosophy can and can't give a contribution to the venture of creating experience of things"--answering that what philosophy can top help in making experience of is "being human."
Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline is one among 3 posthumous books via Williams to be released by way of Princeton college Press. In the start was once the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument was once released within the fall of 2005. The experience of the previous: Essays within the background of Philosophy is being released almost immediately after the current volume.
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For ﬁrst, the word ‘about’ is misleading. In the most normal linguistic sense of ‘about’, it is statements that are about things or persons; but, as we have already seen, not all religious utterances are statements—a prayer, for instance, is not about God, but is addressed to him. If we are to say, then, that religious language is language about God, we have to take ‘about’ in an extremely wide sense. I take it that it would not be disputed by Christians that every religious utterance in some sense comes back to God, perhaps in the sense that if the purpose of the utterance is to be explained, God has in the end to be mentioned.
One difference of this case from that of God could be marked by saying that, leaving aside the question of application, the nature of the numbers in themselves can be adequately expressed in the language appropriate to this, the language of pure mathematics, but the nature of God cannot be adequately expressed in any human language. But if we say this, it looks as though we were defending now a different thesis about religious language. For this seems to say that any statement about God, whether we say that there is a relation between God and the world or not, will be unsatisfactory, just because it is made in the words of human language; but the thesis was that it is the fact that there must be a relation between God and the world that made religious language unsatisfactory.
Tertullian’s Paradox • 9 tiﬁc and other discourse, and between one type of science and another: for not all talk about plants, for instance, and not even all scientiﬁc talk about them is botanical talk. Nor will the distinction of subject-matter apply at all to any but the most naı¨ve distinctions between subsidiary sciences, the distinction elsewhere—for instance, between physics and physical chemistry—lying rather in the scope and terminology of the laws formulated and employed. But it is not to the present purpose, even if it were possible, to attempt the high Aristotelian task of characterizing the differences between organized bodies of knowledge.