By Lewis, Clarence Irving; Merleau-Ponty, Maurice; Sachs, Carl B.; Sellars, Wilfrid; Sellars, Wilfrid
Intentionality is among the vital difficulties of recent philosophy. How can a suggestion, motion or trust be approximately whatever? Sachs attracts at the paintings of Wilfrid Sellars, C I Lewis and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to construct a brand new conception of intentionality that solves a number of the difficulties confronted via conventional conceptions. The hallmark of the idea is a contrast among "discursive intentionality" (the intentionality of propositional proposal and speak) and "somatic intentionality" (the intentionality of physically notion and action). Doing so sheds new mild on Sellars's influential arguments in regards to the 'Myth of the Given' and indicates how we will be able to construct a efficient discourse among American pragmatism, analytical philosophy and eu phenomenology
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Additional resources for Intentionality and myths of the given : between pragmatism and phenomenology
How, he asks, can any part of the natural world bear an intentional relation to any other part? 1 I use ‘original intentionality’ here in Haugeland’s sense: ‘original’ contrasts with ‘derived’, with the kind of intentional, semantic content that sentences and signs have. Since not all semantic content can be derived, the argument goes, there must be original intentionality. Put otherwise, original intentionality does not mean a particular kind of intentionality but rather ground-level, ‘original’ cases of intentionality that need to be understood in order for other cases of intentional content to be understood.
Like Haugeland, I am interested in explaining the place of original intentionality within the broader framework of a naturalistic world-view (subject to caveats about ‘natural’). In that sense, what is original under one set of considerations (the order of understanding) can be a result or product when viewed naturalistically (the order of being). The question is, how to regard original intentionality as something other than a Lever of Archimedes, how to explicate what original intentionality is, and how to explain the place of original intentionality in rerum natura.
But what is the second arrow? Is it causal? Rational? (Both? ) Sellars’s metaphor of “guidance,” borrowed from Wittgenstein, is both insightful and unhelpful; it tells us where to look for transcendental friction but not what it actually is. Hence it should come as no surprise that post-Sellarsian philosophers such as Rorty, Brandom, and McDowell find the notion of sheer receptivity to be utterly unworkable. But if the given is a myth, and sheer receptivity is unworkable, then we might worry that the Demand cannot be satisfied.