By Frederick Gustav Weiss
At contrary ends of over millenia Hegel and Aristotle, nearly by myself of the good ecu thinkers, consciously tried to criticize and strengthen the idea in their predecessors into structures in their personal. either have been therefore devoted in precept to the view that philosophy in each one age of civilization is without delay a product, a feedback, and a recon struction of the values and insights of its personal prior; that the fertile brain can basically beget anew while it has stated and understood a line of ancestors which has resulted in its begetting; that the philosopher as low as the artist can commence with a fresh slate and a blankly open-minded atti tude to the realm which he reveals inside him and ahead of him. guy is through definition rational; philosophy is his non-stop impulse to understand and appraise a unmarried universe of which he unearths himself an element; philosophy consequently includes its background as a constituent section of its personal nature, and the developmental personality of philosophy needs to - except human cause is, unthinkably and unarguably, a trifling fantasy - in a few experience replicate, or perhaps be in a few feel exact with, an basically enhance psychological universe - that's approximately the typical creed of Aristotle and Hegel. either one of them extra believed, as Plato had believed, that what's such a lot actual and intelligible in that universe is eo ipso so much good.
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Additional info for Hegel’s Critique of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mind
535; 402 a 6. , p. 554; 412 a 6-10. , p. 555; 412 a 29. , p. 538; 403 b 6. 6 HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OP ARISTOTLE'S PlflLOSOPHY OP MIND "formulable essence", in Hegel's terminology, its "notion", together with the material conditions, in a single formula. To consider either of these sides of anything in isolation from its co-determinate is to deal in abstractions, and thus to fall short of the "whole truth" of an individual substance. A second question relating to the quoted paragraph above is this: What does Hegel mean when he refers to Aristotle as a "concrete" and "speculative" thinker?
B. Baillie, Hegel's Logic, p. 100; also "Small Logic", trans. from Encyclopaedia by W. Wallace, p. 259. HEGEL;S CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE;S PlllLOSOPHY OF MIND 1 A third and final point regarding the quoted paragraph above is the apparent criticism of Aristotle by Hegel for not blending the series of progressive determinations of the soul into a whole. We shall have much to say about this, for as we have seen, it constitutes generally Hegel's attitude toward the Aristotelian philosophy as a whole. Each aspect of it is thought out "concretely", and "with as much correctness as depth", yet it seems to lack final organization.
The single term for this relation is "energy" or "activity". Each aspect is necessary to the other, in that if we consider a being in act, it can only be intelligible if it acts upon something, while if we consider a being to be passive, it must be passive for something active; the two are so only as relative aspects of an actuality which embraces and accounts for them both.