By Martha C. Nussbaum
Bringing jointly a gaggle of remarkable new essays on Aristotle's De Anima, this ebook covers themes reminiscent of the relation among soul and physique, sense-perception, mind's eye, reminiscence, hope, and proposal, which current the philosophical substance of Aristotle's perspectives to the fashionable reader. The individuals write with philosophical subtlety and wide-ranging scholarship, finding their interpretations firmly in the context of Aristotle's proposal as a whole.u
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Additional resources for Essays on Aristotle's De Anima
Burnyeat's paper responded to our earlier work, and we now respond to him—with a revision and expansion of an argument first produced and circulated in 1984. We allude throughout to the 1984 text of Burnyeat's paper, which has now circulated widely in typescript, and is published in this volume as an unfinished work in progress. Although the debate is bound to continue, we hope that this stage of it states the issues sufficiently clearly that the reader will be able (in the words of that peaceable philosopher Parmenides) to 'judge by reason the very contentious refutation'.
Perception and memory, and emotion and appetite and in general desire, and in addition to these pleasure and pain . . That all the enumerated items are shared by soul and body is not unclear. For all happen with perception: some as its corruptions and privations. That perception comes to be for the soul through body (dia sōmatos) is evident, both from argument and apart from argument. Perception, then, is taken to be the clearest case of something that is a 'common' or 'shared' function. Can this passage be read as weakly as Burnyeat requires, so that perception is 'common to soul and body' just in case it has necessary conditions of receptivity in the sense-organs?
What is it about individuals that makes them the very things they are? And what is it (therefore) that must remain one and the same, if we are going to continue to regard it as the same individual? Aristotle shows that these two questions are held closely together in our discourse and practices. For any good account of change will need to single out as its underlying substrates or subjects items that are not just relatively enduring, but also relatively definite or distinct, items that can be identified, characterized as to what they are.